EU Energy + Industrial Risk Dashboard

01 / European Gas Storage

38.2% full — 4.6 pts below five-year average

Storage at 38.2% — 4.6 percentage points below the five-year seasonal average. The steeper-than-average draw-down through winter 2025–26 reflects elevated heating demand and constrained pipeline supply. Refilling will need to sustain above-average injection rates through summer to reach safe winter buffer levels.

Source: AGSI+ / Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) · Updated weekly

02 / Import Dependency

Russian pipeline share: 41% (2021) → 6% (2025).
LNG now 43% of imports — a new dependency.

Russian pipeline gas collapsed from 155 bcm in 2021 — 41% of total imports — to 16 bcm in 2025 (6%). LNG rose from 62 bcm to 121 bcm over the same period, largely compensating on volume. Norway remains the anchor of pipeline supply at ~110–120 bcm annually. Total import volumes have fallen as efficiency improvements, fuel switching, and lower industrial consumption reduced overall gas demand from ~375 bcm to ~285 bcm. LNG is structurally different from pipeline gas: it is predominantly spot-priced or short-term contracted, exposing European buyers to global LNG market conditions, and requires sustained investment in regasification capacity to maintain flexibility.

Source: Bruegel European Natural Gas Imports Tracker / ENTSOG Transparency Platform · Updated monthly

LNG by origin country

US LNG rose from 12 bcm in 2021 to 62 bcm in 2025, overtaking Qatar to become Europe's largest single LNG supplier. Russian LNG — primarily Yamal — continues to flow at ~14–16 bcm annually, a politically sensitive carve-out from the broader pipeline decoupling. Qatar remains stable at ~22 bcm.

03 / Industrial Cost Differential

EU industrial electricity price 47% above US, 75% above China

EU industrial electricity prices peaked at 168 EUR/MWh in 2022 and have partially normalised to 112 EUR/MWh — still 47% above US rates (76 EUR/MWh) and 75% above Chinese rates (64 EUR/MWh). The gap with the US pre-dated the crisis: EU prices were already 45% higher in 2019. Both the US and China sustained broadly stable industrial electricity costs through the 2021–22 energy shock that drove EU prices to crisis levels. The divergence reflects sustained cost differences rather than a temporary shock. Electricity price levels at this margin influence where energy-intensive investment is directed — aluminium smelting, electrolytic hydrogen production, and large-scale chemical processes all require electricity as a primary input cost, and sustained differentials of this magnitude affect both operating decisions and long-run capacity investment.

EUR/MWh · non-household consumers · taxes and levies included

Source: Eurostat electricity price statistics / IEA Energy Prices / US EIA International Energy Data / IEA China · Updated annually

04 / Fiscal Constraint

Italy 139% debt/GDP · France spreads at 68bps — constrained capacity to absorb shocks

Italy carries 139% debt/GDP; France 112%; Spain 105% — three of the four largest eurozone economies facing simultaneous pressure on fiscal capacity from rearmament commitments, energy transition subsidies, industrial support schemes, and elevated refinancing costs. France's sovereign spread has widened from a post-crisis low of 15bps (2021) to 68bps (2025). Italy's spread, while below its 2022 peak of 248bps, remains elevated at 148bps. Constrained fiscal headroom limits the scale of industrial support programs available precisely when energy cost differentials are highest and capacity investment decisions are being made.

Basis points vs German 10-year Bund

Source: ECB Data Portal / Eurostat Government Finance Statistics / IMF Fiscal Monitor · Updated monthly

05 / Energy-Intensive Industrial Output

EU output 18pts below 2019 baseline — US and China grew through the same period

EU energy-intensive industrial output fell ~20% from the 2019 baseline and has not recovered. Basic metals output — aluminium, steel — was hardest hit: several European smelters suspended production permanently from 2022. US and Chinese output in the same sectors held steady or grew through the same period. The divergence increasingly reflects differences in energy costs, industrial policy support, and investment conditions across regions — a pattern that permanent smelter closures in aluminium and steel since 2022 make difficult to reverse.

Index 2019 = 100 · basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals

Source: Eurostat STS industrial production indices (sts_inpr_m) / US Federal Reserve FRED / IEA / NBS China · Updated annually

06 / EU Carbon Price (ETS)

EUA at ~68 EUR/tonne — substantially above carbon pricing in most competing industrial regions

The EU Emissions Trading System adds a deliberate policy cost to carbon-intensive production. At ~68 EUR/tonne, ETS adds roughly 6–7 EUR/MWh to gas-fired power generation and a direct cost to industrial processes covered by the scheme — steel, cement, chemicals, aluminium. EU allowance prices remain substantially above most competing industrial regions — carbon pricing systems exist in parts of North America and Asia, but at materially lower levels — structurally widening the competitive gap beyond raw energy prices. The 2022–23 peak at ~85 EUR/tonne coincided with gas prices at their highest on record, adding a further policy cost to industrial processes already facing crisis-level energy input costs.

EUR/tonne CO₂ · EUA annual average spot price

Source: ICE Endex / EEX EU Allowances (EUA) — annual average spot price · Updated annually

07 / Grid Interconnection Capacity

Spain at 2.3% — lowest interconnection ratio among Europe's major electricity systems

EU rules require member states to reach a 15% interconnection ratio — cross-border capacity equal to 15% of installed generation — by 2030. Most major economies are well short, and the 2020 interim target of 10% was missed across the board. Spain, with interconnection capacity at 2.3% of installed generation, is among Europe's least-connected major electricity systems; limited cross-border capacity across the Pyrenees constrains the ability to export surplus solar generation during peak production periods and import from France during shortfalls. Midday solar surpluses cannot flow north. The result is intraday price divergence, negative prices at peak solar hours, and growing curtailment of generation with zero marginal fuel cost. Italy is constrained by Alpine geography; Poland by east-west transmission limits that predate the renewable buildout. Even Germany — the closest of the five to the 2030 target — falls short. The gap between where renewables are being built and where cross-border capacity exists compounds curtailment exposure and limits the balancing flexibility needed as variable generation rises.

Interconnection ratio: cross-border NTC as % of installed generation capacity

Source: ENTSO-E Transparency Platform / European Commission National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) · Updated annually